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Quantum information and quantum foundations are becoming popular topics for advanced un-
dergraduate courses. Many of the fundamental concepts and applications in these two fields, such
as delayed choice experiments and quantum encryption, are comprehensible to undergraduates with
basic knowledge of quantum mechanics. In this paper, we show that the quantum eraser, usually
used to study the duality between wave and particle properties, can also serve as a generic platform
for quantum key distribution. We present a pedagogical example of an algorithm to securely share
random keys using the quantum eraser platform and propose its implementation with quantum
circuits.
I. INTRODUCTION
The fields of quantum foundations and quantum infor-
mation are very good examples of themes that are being
actively investigated at the research level and yet are ac-
cessible to undergraduate students who completed a first
course on quantum mechanics [1–3]. Indeed, many un-
dergraduate curricula include courses and seminars on
topics such as quantum communication, quantum com-
puting and algorithms, entanglement, quantum control,
...etc. The two fields are strongly interrelated and ad-
vances in either one leads to breaking new grounds in
the other one [4]. The purpose of this paper is to provide
a pedagogical example of a quantum communication ap-
plication motivated by foundational aspects of quantum
mechanics that illustrates the connections between the
two subjects.
The wave-particle duality of quantum systems has
been one of the cornerstone ideas in quantum mechanics
since its inception in the 1920s. In short, this principle
states that quantum systems cannot exhibit full wave
and particle properties in the same time. For example,
in the double slit experiment, one cannot pinpoint the
slit through which the quantum particle has passed (the
path) and at the same time maintain the interference
fringes on the screen. Very important variations of this
experiment such as delaying the choice of whether or not
to measure the path until after the particle has passed
through the double slits (delayed choice experiments [5])
or reversing the choice, i.e., erasing the which-path in-
formation (WPI) [6], have been implemented in various
experiments over the last two decades [7–11].
On the other hand, quantum key distribution (QKD)
has been one of the earliest applications of quantum infor-
mation [12, 13]. A QKD algorithm aims at securley shar-
ing a random set of bits (the key) between two distant
parties. The most famous QKD algorithm is the Bennett-
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Brassard 1984 (BB84) protocol [14]. In this protocol, the
sender chooses randomly either one of two different basis
states of the photon polarization, i.e., rectilinear or diag-
onal basis. The logical bit is encoded through two pre-
pindicular polarization directions corresponding to bits 1
and 0. The receiver, on the other hand, chooses randomly
to measure the state of the photon in any of the two ba-
sis. The sender and receiver (usually called Alice and
Bob) will communicate in public their basis choices and
register the corresponding bits only when their choices
agree. In doing so, they generate a shared random key
that they can use later for encrypting a message sent on
the public channel. By comparing a subset of the gener-
ated data, they can detect any attempt of eavesdropping
on the communication since any intervention from a third
party in the middle will eventually lead to some errors
in the generated data. The security of this protocol has
been analyzed by many authors (see e.g., [15–17]).
The two fields of quantum information and quanutm
foundations are strongly related and are often pursued
in parallel by many groups. Recently, new protocols for
quantum communications and quantum computing based
on notions in the foundations of quantum mechanics
such as counterfactuality and interaction-free measure-
ment have been proposed [18–21]. The core ingredient in
BB84 algorithm is the existence of two non-orthogonal
encoding schemes for representing the logical bits. In
this paper, we show that the quantum eraser platform
can provide such encoding schemes. Specifically, we pro-
pose a new encryption scheme qualitatively similar to the
BB84 protocol and based on the single photon quantum
eraser platform. We also illustrate how to implement the
proposed scheme using available quantum circuit compo-
nents.
II. THE DIFFERENT FLAVORS OF THE
QUANTUM ERASER
First, we give an overview of the different flavors of the
single photon quantum eraser using the Mach-Zender in-
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FIG. 1. (a) Mach-Zender interferometer with phase difference φ between the two paths. The detection probability at detectors
D1 and D2 exhibit sinusoidal dependence on φ due to the interference between the two paths. (b,c) Which-path information is
added to the setup. In (b), a source of unpolarized photons is used and vertical and horizontal polarizers are added to the two
paths, while in (c), a time delay is added to one path.
terferometer (MZI). In MZI, a photon is sent through a
beam splitter (BS), where its wavefunction is split into
two parts traveling along different paths till they recom-
bine again at another beam splitter before they are de-
tected by either detector D1 or D2 (see Fig. 1-a).
Inside the interferometer, the state of the photon is ex-
pressed as ψ = 1√
2
(|1〉+ |2〉), where |1〉 and |2〉 represent
the states of the photon in the two paths. If we impose
a phase difference φ between the two paths and let the
paths emerging towards the two detectors be labeled A
and B, the wavefunction after the second beam splitter is
1
2 ((1 + e
iφ)|A〉+ (1− eiφ)|B〉). Consequently, the proba-
bility of detecting the photon in D1 is P1(φ) = cos
2(φ/2)
while the probability of detecting the photon in D2 is
P2(φ) = sin
2(φ/2). This sinusoidal dependence on φ is
the hallmark of the interference pattern of the Mach-
Zender interferometer.
In order to know through which path the photon has
traveled, the two paths should be given two different la-
bels through a new degree of freedom of the photon. If
we call the states corresponding to these new labels |H〉
and |V 〉, the state of the photon after emerging from the
second beam splitter is 12 |A〉 ⊗
{|H〉+ eiφ|V 〉}+ 12 |B〉 ⊗{|H〉 − eiφ|V 〉}. It it clear that when |H〉 and |V 〉 are or-
thogonal, i.e., the two paths are fully distinguishable, the
probability of detecting the photon at any of the two de-
tectors will be 0.5, i.e., the interference pattern vanishes.
This can be achieved, for example, using the polarization
of the photon (i.e., vertical or horizontal polarization; see
Fig. 1-b), or the time of arrival of the photon (i.e., by
introducing a sufficiently large time delay T in one path;
see Fig. 1-c) as in time-bin qubits [22]. The former case
can be implemented using a source of unpolarized pho-
tons, and absorbing polarizers in each path, or a source
of linearly polarized photons with a half-wavelength plate
in one path only that rotates the plane of polarization by
90 degrees. In the later case, the time delay should be
adjusted in a way that does not alter the phase difference
between the two paths.
The quantum eraser setup aims at erasing the which-
path information after the photon has passed through
BS2, thus restoring the sinusoidal interference pattern at
D1 and D2. The ability to erase WPI and restore the
interference pattern after the photon has left the inter-
ferometer has invoked an interesting discussion in the
foundations of quantum mechanics that still stimulates
new models and experiments [23, 24]. When exactly does
the photon make the choice to follow a single path (i.e.,
behave as a particle) or traverse the two paths simultane-
ously in superposition (i.e., behave as a wave)? It seems
upfront that the delayed choice experiments hint at a
retrocausal behavior incompatible with orthodox quan-
tum mechanics. Nevertheless, orthodox quantum me-
chanics faces no dilemma here since it is concerned only
with observable effects and the question posed earlier has
no observable consequences. The question may even have
a natural answer in alternative interpretations such as the
de-Broglie Bohm pilot wave interpretation [25, 26] that
employs particles following deterministic trajectories in
the physical space or the two-state vector formalism of
quantum mechanics [27] that uses forward and backward
propagating waves. We shall not be concerned any fur-
ther with this issue in the rest of this paper.
The ideal quantum eraser would utilize a unitary cir-
cuit that takes the outputs of the MZI, erases the WPI
by disentangling the two degrees of freedom and recov-
ers the interference pattern as shown in Fig. 2(a). It
is very likely that this ideal scheme cannot be achieved
in a reversible and deterministic manner by a single uni-
tary circuit for an arbitrary φ. We will show in the next
section an example for a unitary eraser that works for
the specific values of φ = 0 and pi. Nevertheless, we list
below three different nonideal schemes, depicted in Figs.
2-b, 2-c and 2-d, that erase WPI in a probabilistic man-
ner. The idea is to project the photon onto a state that
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FIG. 2. (a) The ideal quantum eraser: A unitary quantum circuit takes the outputs of the second beam splitter in a Mach-
Zender interferometer where which-path information (WPI) is added and erases this information with a unitary transformation,
thus restoring the interference pattern at D1 and D2 in a deterministic manner. We are not sure whether this hypothetical
scheme is feasible or not. (b,c,d) Different realizations of the nonideal quantum eraser. (b) Which-path information is encoded
by the photon’s time of arrival. Photons arriving at the detectors at t = T are in a superposition of the two paths with phase
difference φ and thus exhibit an interference pattern. (c) Which-path information is encoded by inserting horizontal and vertical
polarizers in the two paths. Beam-splitting 45◦ polarizers are inserted at the outputs of BS2 . Photons passing or reflected
from these polarizers will be in a superposition of the two paths before they are detected by D1 (D2) or D3 (D4) and thus
exhibit an interference pattern. (d) Same as in (c), but using absorbing 45◦ polarizers after BS2. Photons will pass through
the polarizers with probability 50% and will be in a superposition of the two paths, thus eliminating WPI and restoring the
interference pattern at half the time.
conceals the path information or selectively measure it
at times when the path information is hidden.
1. A unitary quantum circuit is connected with the
MZI that erases the WPI at certain times only in
a probabilistic manner. When the WPI is encoded
through the photon’s time of arrival by including a
delay element T in one path, the photons will ar-
rive at BS2 at t = 0 or t = T depending on the
path taken by the photon. Adding another MZI
with the same delay element, see Fig. 2-b, will let
the photons be detected at t = 0, t = T and t = 2T
(assuming the delay associated with the other path
without delay to be negligible). The photons de-
tected at t = T will be in a coherent superposition
of the two paths with phase difference φ and thus
exhibit interference. Here, we conditionally select
the cases where the photon emerges in a state that
conceals the path information.
2. Each of the outputs of BS2 is fed into a circuit,
whose two outputs exhibit the interference pattern
in a complementary way. As an example, when
WPI is encoded through the polarization of the
photon by adding horizontal and vertical polariz-
ers to the two paths, we can restore the interfer-
ence by adding 45◦ beam-splitting polarizers to the
outputs of BS2 (see Fig. 2-c). The photons emerg-
ing from each 45◦ polarizer have either 45◦ or 135◦
polarization and exhibit an interference behavior.
This can be easily shown by noting that the 45◦
beam-splitting polarizers transforms |H〉 and |V 〉
into 1√
2
(| ↗〉 ± | ↖〉), where each of | ↖〉 and
| ↗〉 emerge into different paths. A simple calcula-
tion shows that the probabilities of photon detec-
tion at these paths are 12P1(φ) and
1
2P2(φ). Note
4that adding the results of the two detectors in each
branch is equivalent to one detector that does not
exhibit interference as in Fig. 1-b
3. Each of the outputs of BS2 is fed into a dissipa-
tive circuit which absorps the incoming photon or
reemits it in a random fashion. The emerging pho-
tons will have a sinusoidal dependence on φ akin to
the interference behavior without WPI. For exam-
ple, considering again the MZI in case 2, we encode
WPI through the polarization of the photon and
add an absorping 45◦ polarizer to each of the out-
puts of BS2 (see Fig. 2-d). These polarizers let the
photon pass through only if it is polarized at 45◦.
Those photons will be in a coherent superposition
of the two paths and will exhibit interference be-
havior but with a lower visibility [28]. In both 2
and 3, the role of the 45◦ polarizer is to scramble
the WPI encoded in the photon polarization.
We note that in case 1, the second interferometer
has mixed the two outputs of BS2 to condition-
ally create a new interference that occurs when the
time delay no longer distinguishes between the two
paths. On the other hand, cases 2 and 3 can be
viewed as doing projective measurements in a basis
that does not distinguish between the two paths.
III. A QKD ALGORITHM BASED ON THE
QUANTUM ERASER
We are now ready to present a scheme for securely shar-
ing a random key between two agents using the quantum
eraser. Alice wants to generate a key consisting of logical
bits 1 and 0 securely shared with Bob in order to use it for
encrypting messages. The key should be communicated
such that any eavesdropping attempt by Evan, an evil
agent trying to intercept the message, can be detected
by either Alice or Bob.
Alice uses an MZI to encode the bits by the state of
the photon. She has two degrees of freedom, the phase
difference between the two paths and whether to include
WPI or not. Let φ = pi corresponds to bit 1 and φ = 0
corresponds to bit 0. The two outputs of BS2 are sent to
Bob. Bob on his part has the freedom to insert a quantum
eraser or not. In order to share a random secret key, Alice
sends a stream of photons to Bob, with randomly setting
φ = pi or φ = 0 corresponding to logical bits of 1 and
0 while randomly choosing to insert WPI or not. Bob,
on the other side, randomly chooses to insert the eraser
setup or not and records through which detector the pho-
ton was detected. At the end of the transmission, Alice
and Bob announce over the public channel their choices
of WPI and the eraser setup for each transmission event.
Bob also announces whether his eraser setup successfully
erased the WPI, i.e., the photon was detected at the right
time in Fig. 2-b or was actually detected in either D1 or
D2 in Fig. 2-d. Unlike the schemes in Figs. 2-b and
2-d, the scheme in Fig. 2-c is lossless, i.e., the photons
always emerge in either of the two branches creating an
interference of P1(φ) or P2(φ). Therefore, Bob should be
careful while book-keeping the detected photons and use
the respective rule with each branch. Photon’s detection
at D1 and D4 corresponds to logical bit 0 while Photon’s
detection at D2 and D3 corresponds to logical bit 1.
A logical bit will be securely shared between Alice and
Bob when Alice inserts WPI and Bob utilizes the quan-
tum eraser and successfully registers the photon or when
Alice does not insert WPI and Bob does not insert the
quantum eraser. In these two cases, Bob knows with cer-
tainty the value of φ used by Alice through the measure-
ment outcomes of his detectors. The bits corresponding
to these cases are kept by Alice and Bob as parts of the
key. According to the no-cloning theorem [29], Evan can
not measure the phase relationship between the two chan-
nels and the state of WPI (i.e., whether it was inserted
or not and what it was) simultaneously without alter-
ing the state of the photon in the channels, thus causing
discrepancy between the values of the bits registered by
Alice and Bob. Therefore, Alice and Bob can detect the
existence of an eavesdropper by comparing over the pub-
lic channel a subset of their data that will be discarded
later.
It is evident that this algorithm is conceptually identi-
cal to the BB84 algorithm. Therefore, the security of our
scheme can be arbitararily improved using privacy am-
plification methods [30, 31]. On the other hand, in ad-
dition to being quite impractical and more complicated
than BB84, it suffers from the main drawback of the
BB84 [17], namely that it requires very low-noise detec-
tors and efficient single-photon sources since inefficient
single-photon generation will send multiple photons in
the same quantum state, allowing Evan to secretly inter-
cept one of them.
IV. QUANTUM CIRCUIT IMPLEMENTATION
In this section, we introduce a quantum circuit imple-
mentation of the proposed scheme using basic quantum
logic gates. Alice sends two qubits, Q and F, to Bob
as shown in Fig. 3 that are both initialized to |0〉. Q
represents the photon in the quantum eraser while the
flag qubit F represents the which-path information. The
states |0〉 and |1〉 of Q represent the two different paths
of the photon in the MZI. Note that in the MZI of section
2, WPI is encoded through additional degrees of freedom
of the same photon, while here we encode WPI through
another qubit. The two Hadamard gates (H) in Fig. 3
represent the two beam splitters while the Z gate repre-
sents the phase element φ = pi. When Alice chooses to
insert WPI, she inserts a controlled-NOT (CNOT) gate
between the two Hadmard gates that entangles the two
qubits. On the other side, Bob performs two measure-
ments in the Z-basis on the two qubits received from Al-
ice. If he chooses to erase WPI, he can insert an H gate
5Alice
Bob
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FIG. 3. Two quantum circuit implementations for the QKD scheme based on the quantum eraser. Alice sends two qubits
Q and F to Bob and chooses randomly to insert the CNOT and Z gates or not. The Z gate determines whether bit 1 or 0 is
sent while the CNOT gate determines whether which-path information (WPI) is sent or not. Bob measures the state of the
two qubits after choosing randomly to insert the eraser circuit or not. (a,b) depict two different implementations for the eraser
circuit. The dotted boxes indicate the blocks that are randomly inserted by each side to include WPI or the quantum eraser.
to F before he performs the measurement as in Fig. 3-a,
thus effectively measuring in the X-basis, i.e., the infor-
mation about the WPI encoded in the Z-basis is scram-
bled. Alternatively, as in Fig. 3-b, he can insert a CNOT
gate to F followed by a Hadmard gate to Q before doing
the measurements in the Z-basis.
There might be other implementations for the eraser
circuits but we shall focus on these two circuits only. Let
us analyze the operation of the two eraser circuits in Fig.
3. When Alice and Bob compare their choices at the end
of the transmission, the simplest scenario will correspond
to the case when Alice chooses not to insert WPI and
Bob chooses not to insert the eraser. In this case, Bob
can detect directly whether Z-gate was inserted at Alice’s
side or not by measuring Q alone since H2|0〉 = |0〉 and
HZH|0〉 = |1〉. The F qubit is redundant in this case and
therefore Alice can always set it to a random value when-
ever she does not insert WPI. The other scenario corre-
sponding to the valid generation of a secretly shared bit
occurs when Alice chooses to insert WPI and Bob chooses
to insert the quantum eraser. Starting with |QF〉 = |00〉,
it is straightforward to see that with the Z-gate inserted,
the state of the two qubits at Bob’s side directly before
the measurement in Fig. 3-a is 1√
2
(|01〉+ |10〉) and with-
out the Z-gate, the state is 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉), while in Fig.
3-b it is 1√
2
(|00〉 − |11〉) with the Z-gate inserted and
1√
2
(|10〉+ |01〉) without the Z-gate. Bob can thus detect
whether the Z-gate is inserted or not while using either of
the two circuits by detecting whether the measurements
of Q and F yield similar or different results. If Z-gate is
inserted, bit 1 is recorded and if Z-gate is not inserted, bit
0 is recorded. As in BB84, Alice and Bob will communi-
cate their choices over the classical channel to determine
the cases where their choices comply with each other.
Unlike the BB84, which can be implemented with a
single qubit, we need here two qubits to implement this
protocol, one of them is redundant half the time. The
redundancy of the flag qubit can be reduced by several
methods. For example, by using the flag bit to send an-
other bit encoded in the Z-basis that Bob will record as
is during the No-WPI-No-Eraser mode, therefore shar-
ing two bits instead of one bit during that mode. If Evan
decides to intercept this bit, he will eventually introduce
errors during the WPI-Eraser mode since he does not
know a priori when each mode occurs. Another example
is to send two qubits Q1 and Q2 served by the same F
qubit, thus doubling the transmission rate. In this case,
Alice and Bob use WPI-Eraser mode with one of the two
qubits (selected randomly by each of them every time)
and the other mode with the other qubit. As before,
two secret bits are shared when the choices of Alice and
Bob are consistent. It is interesting to note that the two
circuits in Fig. 3-a and 3-b used to erase WPI are com-
pletely different; in one case Bob treats the two qubits
independently while in the other case he uses an entan-
gling two-qubit operation that acts on Q and F before
doing the measurement.
One more difference between the schemes in Fig. 3
and conventional QKD algorithms such as BB84 is the
distinguishability between the different basis states that
are randomly exchanged for representing the logical bits.
The closer these basis states are to each other, the harder
it is for Eve to distinguish between them. In BB84, for
example, the overlap between the two basis is 12 . In
the schemes in Fig. 2, the states sent over the chan-
6nel for logical bit 0 is |00〉 when no WPI is sent and
1
2 (|00〉+ |01〉+ |10〉 − |11〉) when WPI is sent. The over-
lap between the two states is 14 . Therefore, they are more
distinguishable than BB84 algorithm and hence less effi-
cient.
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Let us analyze the most famous eavesdropping attack
strategy, namely the intercept and resend attack, and
compute the quantum bit error rate (QBER) for the
quantum circuits in Fig. 3. In this attack, Evan poses
as Bob, intercepts the two qubits, makes measurements
with or without an eraser setup, and sends a new version
of the two qubits forward to Bob. Let us first consider
the simple No-WPI-No-Eraser mode. In this case, the
two qubits are not entangled, and the flag qubit has a
random value. Suppose that Evan measures Q and re-
sends it to Bob, thus always obtaining a valid bit in this
mode which occurs 50% of the time. Since Evan does
not know beforehand when this mode occurs, he will in-
advertently corrupt the two-qubit state during the WPI-
Eraser mode. More specifically, since the two-qubit state
in the channel during this mode is an equal-weighted su-
perposition of all the bases in the Hilbert space, the F
qubit will be projected due to Evan’s intervention to a
superposition of |0〉 and 1〉. When Bob inserts his eraser
circuit, the state will eventually be a mixture of all the
four basis {|00〉, |01〉, |10〉, |11〉} regardless of whether 0
or 1 was encoded by Alice. Therefore, unsurprisingly like
the BB84 algorithm, Evan will corrupt on average 25%
of the bits of the shared key, i.e., QBER=25%. Simi-
larly, if Evan chooses to intercept both Q and F with
an eraser circuit, posing as Bob, and then generates an
entangled state and sends it to Bob, posing as Alice, he
will inadvertently corrupt 25% of all the shared bits.
While the algorithm presented in this paper may not
be efficient from the practical point of view, it serves as
a pedagogical approach to quantum key encryption that
has the same spirit as the BB84 algorithm using the quan-
tum eraser platform. In the BB84, the two parties freely
choose the measurement basis of the photons while here
they freely choose to insert or erase the which-path infor-
mation. In order to implement BB84, one quantum de-
gree of freedom is sufficient. For example, using a single
qubit for each shared bit, both sides can choose whether
or not to insert a Hadamard gate before the transmis-
sion or the measurement process. Here, the information
is encoded through another qubit that is entangled with
the first one. This reminds us of the deterministic quan-
tum protocols which require at least four degrees of free-
dom for securely sending one deterministic qubit using
a one-way quantum channel [32, 33]. Although perhaps
overcomplicated, the proposed circuit is useful as an ex-
ample of emulating a quantum interference experiment
(the quantum eraser) using a quantum circuit analog.
In conclusion, it was shown in this paper how closely
the fundamental notions of quantum mechanics and the
emerging field of quantum algorithms and quantum infor-
mation are connected. This connection arises since foun-
dational issues in quantum mechanics are best explored
with experiments performed on single quantum particles
while qubits, the basic unit of quantum information, are
carried by single quantum particles as well, i.e., single
photons. As such, the two fields are often overlapping.
For example, entanglement which is a key concept in the
foundation of quantum mechanics is one of the most im-
portant resources in quantum information theory. Given
that much of the fascination of students with quantum
mechanics comes from the paradoxes and controversial
issues in quantum foundations, bringing them in touch
with this field early on in their education may lead to
an accelerated progress in the field of quantum founda-
tions and more likely in the emerging field of quantum
technologies.
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